silver spring transit center: 2015

Sunday, November 1, 2015

news media: what's happening with the lawsuit?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/montgomery-wmata-sue-firms-for-160m-over-troubled-transit-center/2015/08/28/c685a6b8-4dc5-11e5-84df-923b3ef1a64b_story.html

http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/local/silver-spring-transit-center-lawsuit/1809/

$166 million--it'll be interesting to see how much, if any, eventually gets returned to public coffers. My guess is that it won't be enough to cover attorneys' fees and time spent by county and WMATA employees prepping for court, much less "repair" costs, delay costs, extra operations and maintenance costs caused by the cracking and other associated cost overruns.

from the complaint filed with the court:

pg. 2--Montgomery County and WMATA are seeking compensatory damages from PB, FPC and Balter; and, Montgomery County is seeking punitive damages from PB (only).
pg. 3--construction began in the fall of 2008 with a Sept. 9, 2010 anticipated completion date. "Almost immediately, however, defects in PB's design delayed the project for almost 14 months and cost the County millions of dollars to remedy. ... PB refused to correct the critical design defects..."
pg. 4--"For WMATA, several issues remain. ... WMATA has also expended over $864,521.00 in additional costs as a result of Defendants' failure to perform their obligations on the SSTC project."
pg. 5--"WMATA seeks no less than $25,864,521.00 in damages from PB, FPC and Balter for the additional monitoring, inspection, repair and maintenance costs it will incur over the life of the SSTC as a result of the defective design and construction of the facility, as well as for the additional coordination costs incurred."
comments from Washington Post article
pg. 7--WMATA and the County agreed that "the County would take the lead in facilitating the design and construction of the facility". (Roger Berliner take note.)
pg. 9--"... the costs for planning, developing, designing, constructing and finally completing the Transit Center will be paid for by the County. ... In addition, the County agrees to reimburse WMATA staff's costs for document and plan review, project administration and inspection costs associated solely with the Transit Center in an amount not to exceed $942,000. ... WMATA agreed to assign a full time, on site staff person to the Transit Center project." (Note: WMATA is seeking $25,864,521.00 in damages for "additional monitoring, inspection, repair and maintenance costs". Is this in addition to the maximum $942,000 allotted to WMATA for "plan review, project administration and inspection costs"? Wow! One would think for that kind of money, plus a full time, on site staff person assigned to the project, that WMATA would have discovered, over the course of many years while the SSTC was being designed and built, that the 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long SSTC violates WMATA's own design and construction standards by not having expansion joints located every 100 feet or less. But then, this is WMATA--with its lousy inspection and safety record.)
pg. 11--PB's contract is $8,506,283.38. At "substantial completion" PB had been paid $8,278,128.23.
pgs. 12-17 contain details of and excerpts from PB's design contract.
pgs. 17-18 contain details of and excerpts from the on-site project engineer agreement between the County and PB. "Under the terms of the PB Construction Oversight Contract, PB was to bill the County on an hourly basis in an amount not to exceed $465,150.00. PB and the County subsequently amended this contract to increase the not to exceed amount to $1,170,855.00. For the work that it represented that it performed under the PB Construction Oversight Contract, PB has been paid $1,170,825.00."
pgs. 18-22 contain details of and excerpts from the General Construction Contract between the County and FPC. "The fixed price for construction is $65,841,294.00." Construction must conform to WMATA, Federal Transit Administration and Montgomery County requirements. "Liquidated damages" clauses ($8,900.00/day) are included.
pgs. 22-25 contain details of and excerpts from the County's agreements with Balter to inspect work on the SSTC.
pgs. 26 and 27 present problems in design and construction of the SSTC. "Both before and after construction began, WMATA and the County expressed concern to PB about over-restraint in the design of the concrete slabs and questioned whether such a condition would create a problem." (Note: "Over-restraint" is what you get in a 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long concrete building that doesn't have any expansion joints (despite the fact that WMATA design and construction standards require that expansion joints be placed at least every 100 ft.) The "over-restraint" isn't restricted to just slabs; but, beams, girders and columns are "over-restrained" too. One would think that with all of the people looking at plans over the course of the many years during which design, permitting, construction and (supposedly) inspection took place, that someone would have realized that a 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long concrete building without expansion joints is "over-restrained". Structures 101. DUH!)
pgs. 27 to 29 present a brief summary of the County retaining structural engineering firm KCE to investigate design, construction and inspection defects and to develop solutions. Page 29 states: "Balter, whom the County had retained as its watchdog ... and paid $1,124,399.57 for its services, ... (Balter) apparently never detected ... defects ..."
pgs. 29 to 31 present remedial actions taken in response to KCE's report. On page 30 it states: "the County asked PB on more than one occasion to provide its shear and torsion calculations... PB responded repeatedly that it had already provided those calculations... Ultimately, PB admitted that it had never performed the shear and torsion calculations... PB refused to participate in devising a solution."
pg. 31 states: "In addition to the $77,574,332.00 it had already been paid, FPC was paid millions of dollars for this remediation work, which would have been unnecessary if the job had been done correctly the first time."
pgs. 31 and 32 discuss transfer of the SSTC to WMATA.
Montgomery County passing the severely flawed Silver Spring Transit Center to equally flawed WMATA
pgs. 32 to 57 describe each of the counts of the complaint, which are as follows:

count 1--breach of PB's design contract

count 2--breach of PB construction oversight contract

count 3--breach of express warranty (PB) (Note: For those of us who aren't lawyers, "breach of express warranty" is like when a public official (e.g. David Dise, Isiah Leggett, George Leventhal, et al) make statements like "we're going to get all of the money back from those who are responsible"--a promise. When the promise isn't kept, e.g., the public doesn't get back all of the money from those who the promise-maker says are responsible, then that's breach (breaking) of express warranty (promise).

count 4--professional negligence (PB design contract)

count 5--professional negligence (PB construction oversight contract)

count 6--indemnification-hold harmless (PB)

count 7--intentional misrepresentation (PB)

count 8--negligent misrepresentation (PB)

count 9--gross negligence (PB)

count 10--breach of contract (FPC)

count 11--breach of express warranty (FPC)

count 12--negligence (FPC)

count 13--indemnification-hold harmless (FPC)

count 14--breach of contract (Balter)

count 15--professional negligence (Balter)

count 16--indemnification-hold harmless (Balter)

count 17--breach of PB design contract WRT WMATA

count 18--breach of express warranty (PB) WRT WMATA

count 19--professional negligence (PB) WRT WMATA

count 20--indemnification-hold harmless (PB design contract) WRT WMATA

count 21--breach of contract (FPC) WRT WMATA

count 22--breach of express warranty (FPC) WRT WMATA

count 23--negligence (FPC) WRT WMATA

count 24--indemnification-hold harmless (FPC) WRT WMATA

count 25--breach of contract (Balter) WRT WMATA

count 26--professional negligence (Balter) WRT WMATA

One third of the total counts are Montgomery County's against Parsons Brinckerhoff. When WMATA's counts against PB are added, then one half of the total counts are against Parsons Brinckerhoff. Feel the love!

For the past two and one half years the news media (print, TV, radio, internet) have reported one side of the story--Montgomery County's--Isiah Leggett, George Leventhal, Roger Berliner, David Dise (ad nauseum), et al. The games have just begun. Let's hear what PB, FPC and Balter have to say. We're bound to learn some things different from what Montgomery County and the news media have been saying for the past two and a half years.

One thing for sure--we taxpayers, lose again!

Silver Spring Transit Center
Paul S. Sarbanes Transit Center
Montgomery County MD
WMATA
public-private partnership
crony capitalism
Maryland Transit Administration (MTA)
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
Purple Line
Gov. Hogan

Monday, October 26, 2015

Without expansion joints the restrained SSTC is a threat to public safety

Instead of holding public meetings so that federal, state and local taxpayers who paid for the "monumental debacle" Silver Spring Transit Center could ask questions and comment on the public record, Montgomery County's David Dise, Isiah Leggett, George Leventhal, Roger Berliner, et al ran their collective mouths to the news media (print, TV, radio, internet) for two and a half years saying that the "SSTC will absolutely be safe" (an absolutely absurd statement since nobody can predict the future) and that Montgomery County is not to blame for any of the Silver Spring Transit Center's serious design, construction and inspection flaws, which is equally absurd.

Since March 2013 when the extensive cracking and other design, construction and inspection flaws became public, no one from the news media has bothered to ask Montgomery County, or WMATA, why the SSTC doesn't have expansion joints located at least every 100 feet---a WMATA requirement.

The average coefficient of expansion/contraction for concrete structures is approximately 0.0000055 inch change in length per inch of total length per degree temperature change. Temperatures in Washington DC can reach above 100 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer (with the temperature of the surface of the SSTC's exposed concrete deck being tens of degrees greater) and below 20 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter. The 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long SSTC expands and contracts 1.66 inches and 3.06 inches respectively for an 80 degree change in temperature.

Not long after the SSTC's cracking became public, it was reported that a person from builder Foulger Pratt said that "the SSTC is like a tightly wound snare drum". This is consistent with KCE's report that says that the SSTC doesn't have any expansion joints. Built without expansion joints, the SSTC is massive, monolithic, restrained and cracked.

Had the massive SSTC been built with expansion joints, as standard construction practice and WMATA design and construction standards require, then it would be unrestrained, and the resulting smaller "pieces" (separated by expansion joints) would be able to absorb changes in temperature without unduly stressing and cracking the entire structure. (Smaller "pieces" mean smaller changes in length for the same temperature change.)

But, the SSTC wasn't built with expansion joints. Slabs, beams, girders and columns were constructed monolithically; it is restrained. An 80 degree change in temperature stresses and cracks the jointless SSTC as it tries to expand and contract.

Can you imagine the force on the restrained slabs, beams, girders and columns when the 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long SSTC expands and contracts 1.66 inches and 3.06 inches respectively? Enough to make concrete crack! Have you ever tried to crack a 12 inch thick piece of concrete? It takes a LOT of force! The SSTC is indeed "a monumental debacle" and "like a tightly wound snare drum"!

It should be noted that the 80 degree temperature change for Washington DC used for these calculations is well within the 121 degree difference between the record high of 106 and record low of -15 for Washington DC. (U.S. state temperature extremes - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)

The heating and cooling cycle never ends--daily, monthly, yearly--generating new cracks for moisture to penetrate, freeze and loosen concrete, potentially falling on unsuspecting commuters. Without expansion joints the restrained SSTC is a threat to public safety.

a comment to a Washington Post article:

a comment to an ENR article:

Since March 2013 the news media (print, TV, radio, internet) have failed to get to the bottom of the Silver Spring Transit Center debacle. A modicum of skepticism along with a few simple questions (and followup) to Montgomery County and WMATA would have uncovered the truth:

to Montgomery County and WMATA: Why doesn't the SSTC have expansion joints like other large outdoor structures (parking garages, stadiums, bridges, etc.)?

to WMATA: Given that the SSTC was supposed to have been designed and built to WMATA standards, and that WMATA was paid to review the design and construction, how could WMATA miss, for nearly a decade, that the 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long SSTC doesn't have any expansion joints, particularly when WMATA's own design and construction standards require expansion joints to be located no farther apart than every 100 ft.?

to Montgomery County and WMATA: Given this major design and construction deficiency (total lack of expansion joints and the cracking that will continue to happen because of it), and other serious design, construction and inspection flaws documented in the reports that you (Montgomery County and WMATA) commissioned, how can you tell the public that "the SSTC will absolutely be safe"?

to Montgomery County: Given that the SSTC is Montgomery County's project, and that Montgomery County is responsible for reviewing, approving, and permitting all construction in Montgomery County, both private and public, and given that you handpicked engineer Parsons Brinckerhoff, builder Foulger Pratt and inspector/materials tester Balter Company without the normal competition that accompanies selecting private companies for most public works projects, and given that Montgomery County was construction manager for the SSTC with a team of full-time county employees onsite during construction, how can you say that Montgomery County doesn't bear any responsibility for the SSTC's serious design and construction flaws?

One would think that with hundreds (if not thousands) of print, TV, radio and internet reports since March 2013 that one of the scores of reporters would have thought to ask these simple questions and to follow up on the obvious "smoke" coming from both Montgomery County and WMATA.

Without expansion joints the restrained SSTC is a threat to public safety.

The fundamental responsibility of an engineer is to "hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public."
Code of Ethics | National Society of Professional Engineers

Silver Spring Transit Center
Paul S. Sarbanes Transit Center
Montgomery County MD
WMATA
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
Maryland Transit Administration (MTA)
public-private partnership
crony capitalism
Purple Line
Gov. Hogan

Sunday, October 25, 2015

Politics trumps common sense

Rift forming between Md., D.C. Metro board members - WTOP

"...when Maryland came forward with us taking over that crazy Silver Spring white elephant, I went along, even though I had my doubts about it. ... In the meantime, the board has yet to hire a new general manager. Nine months have passed since Richard Sarles retired in January."

Politics trumps common sense--small wonder that Metro is so screwed up.

Metro board chair violated conflict rules, D.C. inspector general says - The Washington Post

WMATA
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
Silver Spring Transit Center
Paul S. Sarbanes Transit Center
Montgomery County MD
public-private partnership
crony capitalism
Purple Line
Gov. Hogan

Monday, September 28, 2015

Truth is stranger than fiction

Metro board chair violated conflict rules, D.C. inspector general says - The Washington Post

If our reaction to a story about a man who serves as chairman of the board of a large public agency ("public" in the sense of the HUGE amounts of public money that it takes to subsidize it) saying that he doesn't see anything wrong with taking hundreds of thousands of dollars from a private company that does millions of dollars of work for the same public agency doesn't stop us in our tracks (excuse the pun), then we must ask ourselves if we haven't gone completely numb.

Metro board chairman cleared of alleged ethics violation - The Washington Post

"In a Nov. 6 memo to Downey, the ethics committee, made up of four fellow board members, said it had reviewed Downey’s long-term business relationship with engineering giant Parsons Brinckerhoff and 'determined that no additional investigation or action is warranted.'”

What else did you expect?

If it looks like a duck,

swims like a duck,

and quacks like a duck,

then it's a duck.

WMATA
Mortimer Downey
ethics
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
Silver Spring Transit Center
Paul S. Sarbanes Transit Center
Montgomery County MD
Maryland Transit Administration (MTA)
public-private partnership
crony capitalism
purple line
Gov. Hogan

Friday, September 25, 2015

Politicians make poor sources in engineering and construction matters

As Long-Delayed Maryland Transit Hub Finishes, Project Litigation Starts | ENR

Silver Spring Transit Center
Paul S. Sarbanes Transit Center
Montgomery County MD
WMATA
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
Maryland Transit Administration (MTA)
public-private partnership
crony capitalism
Purple Line
Gov. Hogan

Monday, September 21, 2015

Circus

If someone were to ask me to describe in one word what's gone on since March 2013 when the structural report for the Paul S. Sarbanes Silver Spring Transit Center became public, then I would say "circus".

We've only heard from one side--Montgomery County and WMATA. What the news media (print, TV, radio, internet) have reported is not the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. From the public statements of David Dise, Isiah Leggett, George Leventhal, et al and Jack Requa, it's obvious to me that they, and the news media, don't know squat about engineering and construction.

What's troubling is the "spin" and the outright false statements that have been widely disseminated from people who should know better. One example of this is the often repeated statement "the SSTC will absolutely be safe". ("...it survived an earthquake." What an idiotic statement! so did lots of structures more than 100 years old! This just proves that David Dise doesn't know anything about construction. And the fact that Isiah Leggett and George Leventhal would repeat it proves that they don't know anything about engineering and construction either.)

No one can make that claim--a claim that is made even more ludicrous given the March 2013 structural report. Severe design, construction and inspection flaws are documented. "Repairs" didn't address all of them, e.g. the transit center's complete lack of expansion joints. How many more serious, undetected design, construction and inspection flaws may be hidden inside the SSTC's deeply flawed concrete frame? Only Superman knows because only he has x-ray vision that can see clearly through hardened concrete.

Not even the most knowledgeable experts in engineering and construction can make that claim, because none of us are Superman. David Dise should know better and so should Isiah Leggett and George Leventhal. Frankly, I expect that such a ridiculous claim would have "raised flags" with the news media--but apparently not. The rosy picture that Jack Requa, David Dise, Isiah Leggett, George Leventhal, et al have been painting of the state of the transit center should have also raised flags.

It should be obvious to everyone that if David Dise and his Department of General Services had done their job, then cracking and other major design, construction and inspection flaws would have been addressed before the SSTC was complete. It should be equally obvious that David Dise has spent the last 2.5 years making CYA statements to the news media, and Isiah Leggett and George Leventhal have been parroting Dise's statements.

Politicians "spin", and, with help from the news media, they get away with it. That has certainly been the case for the last 2.5 years with the Silver Spring Transit Center.

We've not heard from Parsons Brinckerhoff, Foulger Pratt or Balter Co. I suspect that they're saving their talking for court. Court will be long and tedious with testimony from both sides--some of it technical. However, some things should be obvious even to those who don't have a background in engineering and construction--like "the Silver Spring Transit Center will absolutely be safe."

Montgomery County and WMATA seek $166 million in their lawsuit against Parsons Brinckerhoff, Foulger Pratt and Balter Company. $25.8 million is Metro's "share". That leaves $140.2 million for Montgomery County, less court costs, Sam Ewing's fees, private experts' testimony, time spent by county employees--testifying, preparing for testimony, debriefing, etc. Let's see how the county makes out. After all, Isiah Leggett is a legal expert, and numbers, independently verified by a reputable national auditor, don't lie.

Silver Spring Transit Center
Paul S. Sarbanes Transit Center
Montgomery County MD
WMATA
public-private partnership
crony capitalism
Purple Line
Gov. Hogan

Sunday, September 20, 2015

Far from over

Now that the Paul S. Sarbanes Silver Spring Transit Center is open, what's ahead? Lots.

First, there's the structure itself. Plagued with problems before it opened, will it continue to be plagued with problems in the future? Will "chunks of concrete" that fell off the structure before it opened continue to fall off? It may take a few winters to do so, but I don't think that it'll be too long before the first "chunk of concrete" comes crashing down. We'll see.

The other thing to watch is the lawsuits. It's incomprehensible to me how the major players in this project, Montgomery County (owner, construction manager, and responsible for reviewing and approving all construction in the county), WMATA (future owner and operator and responsible for assuring that the design and construction meets WMATA standards), Parsons Brinckerhoff (engineer), Foulger Pratt (general contractor), and Balter Company (materials testing and construction inspector and special quality control inspector), could have screwed up this project so badly.

Hopefully, we'll find out more as the lawsuits progress; but, IMHO they're all responsible. With that many people on the job, the serious design, construction and inspection flaws should never have happened. This is particularly true of the transit center's complete lack of expansion joints. WMATA's design and construction standards call for expansion joints to be spaced no more than 100 feet apart. How did WMATA miss that? How did Parsons Brinckerhoff miss it? How did Montgomery County miss it? Foulger Pratt? Balter Co.? There's no excuse; none of them were doing their job.

Not to be forgotten are the "money guys"--the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Maryland Transit Administration (MTA). Certainly the "money guys" have some responsibility in making sure that the investment that the public is making is worthwhile. Or, did they just blindly dole out the taxpayers' money with no regard to what the taxpayers were buying?

Stay tuned. Answers may be coming.

Silver Spring Transit Center

Paul S. Sarbanes Transit Center

Montgomery County MD

WMATA

Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

Maryland Transit Administration (MTA)

public-private partnership

crony capitalism

Purple Line

Gov. Hogan

Sunday, September 13, 2015

Think about it

Montgomery County reviews and approves all construction, public and private, in the county, and issues construction and occupancy permits. For the Silver Spring Transit Center, Montgomery County's own project, the county was construction manager with a team of full time county employees on site during construction.

A March 15, 2013 report documents serious design, construction and inspection flaws with the Silver Spring Transit Center.
The SSTC's columns, girders, beams and deck slabs are severely cracked.
A May 2, 2013 report provides WMATA's consultant's evaluation of the SSTC.
The 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long SSTC has no expansion joints, despite WMATA's design and construction standards that call for expansion joints to be located no farther apart than every 100 feet.
The SSTC was supposed to have been designed and built in accordance with WMATA's design and construction standards.
"Repairs" to the SSTC do not address the SSTC's complete lack of expansion joints.
Without expansion joints the SSTC will continue to crack in the future.
An April 15, 2014 report by Montgomery County's Inspector General documents Montgomery County's deficiencies in managing the SSTC's design, construction, and inspection.
On August 24, 2015 Montgomery County and WMATA filed a lawsuit against Montgomery County's handpicked builder, engineer and inspector, accusing them of negligence and breach of contract.
More than four years overdue and $50+ million over budget, the SSTC opens to the public on Sunday, September 20, 2015.

And yet, Montgomery County's David Dise, Isiah Leggett, George Leventhal, Roger Berliner, et al claim that Montgomery County bears no responsibility in the SSTC's severe design, construction, inspection and management flaws. Really? Think about it.

Many of those who live and/or work in the many highrises in Silver Spring, Bethesda, Chevy Chase and Rockville will be watching the SSTC and following the lawsuit closely.

This is a comment from a Washington Post article.
Personally speaking, if this prediction happens, and someone(s) gets hurt or killed, then I wouldn't want to be David Dise, Isiah Leggett, George Leventhal, Roger Berliner, et al, or WMATA, or one of the many news reporters (print, TV, radio, internet) who supposedly "covered" this story, or one of the many transit center/Montgomery County/Democrat zealots (one who even suggested opening the transit center in March 2013 without addressing the widespread cracking), or, needless to say, the SSTC's private company engineer, builder or inspector. I hope that "chunks of concrete", that were reported months ago to have fallen from the SSTC, don't hit someone(s); but, the laws of physics are unrelenting.

"You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time." - Abraham Lincoln

except after March 2013, when David Dise, Isiah Leggett, George Leventhal, Roger Berliner, et al have fooled all of the news media all of the time.

Silver Spring Transit Center
Paul S. Sarbanes Transit Center
Montgomery County MD
WMATA
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

Maryland Transit Administration (MTA)
public-private partnership
crony capitalism
Purple Line
Gov. Hogan

Thursday, September 3, 2015

Taxpayers, toast your brand new purchase with a cookie

Metro plans Sept. 20 opening of problem-plagued Silver Spring Transit Center - The Washington Post

All are invited.

Funding for the Silver Spring Transit Center is 36% Montgomery County, 11% State of Maryland and 53% Federal (that's everybody!).

Celebrate your brand new purchase with a cookie.

That's the way that the SSTC cookie crumbles!

Can you recall a brand new public works project (school, library, community center, etc.) opening on a Sunday? What are the politicians thinking?!?

Dedication plaque

Taxpayers, your buying the Silver Spring Transit Center is like paying more than retail for a brand new custom sports car, and getting this in return:

Congratulations! Such a deal!

Silver Spring Transit Center
Paul S. Sarbanes Transit Center
Montgomery County MD
WMATA
Maryland Transit Administration (MTA)
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
public-private partnership
crony capitalism
Purple Line
Gov. Hogan

Sunday, August 23, 2015

Cracks

As a civil engineer, I was shocked when I read KCE’s March 15, 2013 structural evaluation report for the Silver Spring Transit Center. I was shocked to see extensive cracking in slabs, beams, girders and columns. I was shocked to learn that the 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long SSTC doesn’t have any expansion joints.

"The size of the concrete structure whether it is a bridge, a highway, or a building does not make it immune to the effects of temperature. ... Severe problems develop in massive structures where heat cannot be dissipated. Thermal contraction on the concrete’s surface without a corresponding change in its interior temperature will cause a thermal differential and potentially lead to cracking. Temperature changes that result in shortening will crack concrete members that are held in place or restrained by another part of the structure, internal reinforcement or by the ground. ... Joints are the most effective way to control cracking." http://www.engr.psu.edu/ce/courses/ce584/concrete/library/cracking/thermalexpansioncontraction/thermalexpcontr.htm

Even though I understand exactly what the KCE report is saying, I am surprised by the report’s indirect wording that the SSTC doesn’t have any expansion joints (e.g. pgs. 5, 14, 19, 36, 46).

Why didn’t KCE come right out and say it: “The 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long SSTC doesn’t have any expansion joints despite the fact that WMATA’s design and construction standards, to which the SSTC was supposed to have been designed and constructed, require expansion joints to be located no more than 100 ft. apart.”?

One thing is clear. Cracking isn't restricted to only the slabs. Beams, girders and columns are cracked too.

The entire structure is cracked, just as one would expect of a 315 ft. by 580 ft. concrete monolith that doesn't have any expansion joints.

The average coefficient of expansion/contraction for concrete structures is approximately 0.0000055 inch change in length per inch of total length per degree change in degrees Fahrenheit. Temperatures in Washington DC can reach above 100 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer (with the temperature of the surface of the SSTC's exposed concrete deck being tens of degrees greater) and below 20 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter. If the 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long SSTC was unrestrained, then it would undergo a 1.66 inches change in width and a 3.06 inches change in length with an 80 degree temperature swing.

But, the SSTC is restrained without expansion joints. Can you imagine the force on the restrained slabs, beams, girders and columns when the 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long SSTC tries to expand and contract 1.66 inches and 3.06 inches respectively? Enough to make concrete crack! Have you ever tried to crack a 12 inch thick piece of concrete? It takes a LOT of force!

Putting an epoxy overlay on the decks won't stop the deck slabs from cracking. Externally bracing some beams won't stop beams from cracking. Doing nothing to address cracking in girders and columns won't stop them from cracking either.

The SSTC will continue to crack. Why? Because it gets hot in the summer and cold in the winter, and because the 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long SSTC is "over-restrained", not allowing it to expand in summer's heat and contract in winter's cold without cracking. Why is the SSTC "over-restrained"? Because the 315 ft. wide by 580 ft. long concrete monolith doesn't have any expansion joints! Simple.

Why don't they retrofit the SSTC to add expansion joints? That's not so simple. The SSTC is one, giant, massive, concrete, monolith. If it had expansion joints (like WMATA design and construction standards require), then it would be at least 24 separate structures with gaps (expansion joints) in between to allow for expansion in the summer and contraction in the winter.

How does one retrofit a concrete structure that was designed and built as one, massive, concrete monolith into 24 separate structures--after the fact? How would one cut a 4-legged table, permanently anchored to the floor underneath it, into 24 smaller tables without the larger table collapsing in the process? How does one retrofit the SSTC into 24 smaller, separate structures? I have no idea, other than to tear it down and start over. Even if there is a way to retrofit the SSTC with expansion joints no farther than 100 ft. apart (like WMATA design and construction standards require), would it be practical and cost effective to do so? Or, would it be more practical and cheaper to tear the SSTC down and start all over again?

Did Montgomery County review KCE’s report before it was finalized? Did an earlier draft have more direct language stating that the SSTC doesn’t have any expansion joints? Did Montgomery County ask that the direct wording be changed? Did KCE change direct language in an earlier draft not wishing to “bite the hand that feeds them”?

I don’t know the answer to these questions; but, I find it strange that KCE’s report, Montgomery County officials, their paid and unpaid consultants, WMATA, and the news media haven't stated more clearly that the SSTC's severe cracking is the result of its complete lack of expansion joints.

Conspiracy to defraud the public?